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Summary: Optimization of Safeguards Effort
This report was prepared within the framework of a research contract
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in vienna.
It contains the preparation and the mathematical treatment of an tnspection
model as weIl as a detailed application of the theoretical considerations to
a reprocessing plant of the NFS type and a fabrication plantof the ALKEM
type.
In the theoretical part two possible means of diverting material are
considered: diversion by means of falsification of data and diversion
without falsification of data within the scope of measurement accuracy.
In the first case two different statistical models are examined. The
first provides for the inspector checking the operator's da ta by means
of sample remeasurement. In the following report this will be called D1-
statistics. In the second model the inspector compares the sum of his
data with the sum of all measurement data reported by the operator; we
shall call this Dz-statistics. This will be applied if it is no longer
possible for the inspector to check the batch after it has been measured
by the operator •
.. Diversion without faiSification of data within the scope of measurement
accuracy is examined on the basis of material balance by single and double
inventory.
The inspector assumes an overall probability a of the error of the first
kind which is divided for the first and second inventory due to the
restriction I-a = (l-aI)·(I-aZ)' We assume that the operator diverts the amount
MI in the first and the amount MZ in the second inventory period under the
restriction M = MI+MZ.
In one instance that is important because of its relevance to practical
application it can be shown that the optimal inspector strategie (oIo,aZ
o)
is independent of the amount M.
In chapter 111 we work out numerical examples using the reference plants
data described in chapter 11. The examples are meant to demonstrate the
possibilites and restrictions of the methods developed in chapter I. This
is achieved with the help of extetlsi.ve pa.ra11lter variations. The report closes
with a summary of the most important results and a reference to fields of
research where future work could be of use.
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Der vorliegende Bericht wurde im Rahmen eines Forschungsauftrages mit
der International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Wien angefertigt. Er
enthält die Aufstellung und die mathematische Behandlung eines In-
spektionsmodells sowie eine ausführliche Anwendung der theoretischen Überle-
gungen auf eine Wiederaufbereitungsanlage vom Typ der NFS und eine Fa-
brikationsanlage vom ALKEM Typ.
Im theoretischen Teil werden Z Arten von Materialentwendung berücksichtigt,
Entwendung mittels Datenverfälschung und Entwendung ohne Datenverfälschung
im Rahmen der Meßgenaugkeit. Im ersten Falle werden zwei verschiedene
statistische Modelle betrachtet. Das erste sieht eine Kontrolle der
Betreiberdaten durch Nachmessen von Stichproben seitens des Inspektors
vor. Es wird im folgenden mit Dt-Statistik bezeichnet werden. Im zweiten
Modell vergleicht der Inspektor die Summe seiner Daten mit der Summe aller
vom Betreiber berichteten Meßdaten, wir werden es Dz-Statistik nennen. Es
wird dann verwendet, wenn nach erfolgter Betreibermessung eine Kontrolle
des Batches durch den Inspektor nicht mehr möglich ist.
Die Entwendung ohne Datenverfälschung im Rahmen der Meßgenauigkeit wird
anhand der ~futerialbilanz bei der einfachen und zweifachen Inventur be-
trachtet. Der Inspektor gibt sich eine Gesamtfehlalarmwahrscheinlichkeit
(J( vor, die sich rUr die erste und. zweite I.nventur vermöge der 'Nebenbe-
dingung 1- 0<. = (1- ~l) (1- c(2) aufteilt. Es wird angenommen, der Betreiber
entwendet in der ersten Inventurperiode die Menge MI/in der zweiten die
Menge MZ unter der Nebenbedingung M = Mt + MZ. In einem für die Praxis
wichtigen Fall kann gezeigt werden, daß die optimale Inspektorstrategie
(o<~ , ~~ ) unabhängig von der Größe von Mist.
In Kapitel 111 werden numerische Beispiele mit den Daten der in Kapitel VI
beschriebenen Referenzanlagen gerechnet. Diese Beispiele sollen die Mög-
lichkeiten und Beschränkungen der in Kapitel I entwickelten Methoden
aufzeigen. Dies wird durch umfangreiche Parametervariationen erreicht. Der
Bericht endet mit einer Zusammenfassung der wichtigen Ergebnisse und
einem Ausblick auf die Gebiete, wo weitere Forschungsarbeiten nützlich sein
könnten.
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Introduction
After the basic features of an international system for safeguarding the
fissionable material Were laid down in the lAEA document INFCIRC/153
in 1971, the factors influencing the efficiency of such a system became
fairly weIl defined. The problem of optimization of safeguards efforts
for such a system could then be expected to be defined in tangible terms
and the problem treated in a formalized manner.
An analysis of the components influencing the safeguards system in terms
of INFCIRC/153 revealed quite early that the optimization of safeguards
effort involves comp1ex re1ationships between the measurement systems
and theoperational mode of specific fadli ties, safaguards inspection
activities needed to verify the status of nuclear materials in these
faci1ities, the amounts and eosts of inspection efforts required and the
effectiveness of the resu1ts of inspection in arriving at a technica1 con-
c1usion of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period,
giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated. It was also recognized
that statistical and mathematica1 methods for re1ating the complex activities
would be an important too1 for the determination of the steps needed to im-
prove the overall efficiency of the safeguards system, particular1y insofar
as management decisions are invo1ved.
The use of decision theoretical methods for the analyses of the efficiency
of international safeguards systems has been a subject matter of investigation
at the Safeguards Project Karlsruhe, Atomic Research Center, since 1968.
Alreaay at that time i t had become clear that the use of conventional
measurement and samp1ing statistics was not sufficient inthis specific
field. The inspection authority has not only to do with the objective
nature which generates errors according to a random law but with human
beings which may purpose1y choose - if they want so - among different
modes of diversion. However, it appeared to be a great obstacle for the
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application of decision theoretical methods that payoff parameters for
the gain and the loss of the operator in case of detecte~ and undetected
diversion had to be defined. It was not possible to get a comrnon opinion
about the values of these payoff parameters. Only after it was found
that for the question of the optimal allocation of a siven inspection effort
the values of the payoff parameters nust not be known that the great value of
the theory was recognized.
In the frameuorkof the present contract with the Agency, the project was
requested to analyse the possibility of using garne theoretical methods for
optimizing safeguardsefforts in nuclear facilities. Besides purely theoretical
and model considerations, the practical use of such methods uas to be shown
with the help of two examples one for a reprocessing and the other for a
Pu-fabrication plant.
The present report contains the results of this analysis.
In chapter I, the basic framework and the boundary conditions for the use of
game theoretical methods in optimizing safeguards efforts have been fixed.
The mathematical formalism for the optimization has then been developed
indicating the areas of its application as also its limitations. Ä co~arison
with another method (Stewart) which is not based on game theory, has also
been made using a specific numerical example. The chapter ends with a set of
conclusions.
Chapter 11 contains all the relevant plant and safeguards data required to
illustrate the application of methods developed in chapter I. The data used
for a reprocessing plant correspond to those of the NFS-plant. The plant
specific data were mainly obtained from published literature and corroborated
by the representativesof the IAEA. Data on safeguards specific activities
(inspection manhours for specific safeguards activities, measurement times
etc.) were mostly obtained from the specialists on Reprocessing Plants at
the lAEA.
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The data used for Pu-fabrication are typical of an Alkem-type-plant. They
are ~ of the Alkem plant. The Alkem plant is not yet in operation. However,
to obtain as realistic a set of data as possible, these data were laid down
after detailed discussions with the Alkem plant management and operation staff.
In chapter 111 numerical examples with parameter variations for the two
reference plants have been given. The parameters varied are the errors first
and second kind, the overall costs for safeguards (sampIe analysis and manhour
costs) and the amounts of fissionable material assumed to be diverted. For all
these parameter variations, the number of inventory takings per year has always
been kept at two.
The influence of other safeguards measures like sealing, use of correlations
and shipper-receiver differences have not been analysed explicitly in this
report as otherwise, the basic purpose of this work, namely to investigate
the implications and usefulness of game theoretical methods would not have
come out very explicitly. However, some of these redundant measures have
been built in implicitly in the estimations of the basic safeguards effort
in a plant (e.g. sealing).
The main purpose of the numerical examples in this chapter is to illustrate
the application and the limitations of the methods developed in chapter I.
The actual numbers obtained cr used should in no way prejudice the safeguards
activities in an actually operating facility. For example, the actual numher
and type of batches, or the measurement accuracies may have totally different
values in such a facility.
The report ends with a chapter on conclusion. It includes a summary of the
important conclusions drawn in individual chapters and a discussion of the
areas in which further research activities might appear to be desirable.
Chapter I
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Theoretical Considerations on the Verification of ~'laterial
Accountancy by Xeans of Random Sampling
1. Introduction
According to the lAEA model agreement /1/ safeguards is based mainly
on the concept of the verification of the material balance in a nuclear
plant for a given period of time. This means that the operator of the plant
takes all the measures necessary for the establishment of the book inven-
tory over a certain period of time and furthermore, for the establishment
of the physical inventory at the end of that period of time and that he re-
ports these data to the safeguards authority. An inspector of the safeguards
authority checks these data on a random sampling basis with the help of in-
dependent measurements. If he has found no significant differences between
the operator's reporteQ values and his own corresponding findings he takes
all the data of the operator and tries to close the material balance, i.e.
he checks whether or not there is a significant difference between the book
and the physical inventory at the end of the inventory period.
An analysis oftheeffidency of this verification scheme has to take into
account two principle possibilities for the operator to divert nuclear
material: •
(i) The operator falsifies his reported data in such a way that the
material balance is closed even though some material has been
removed
(ii) The operator simply removes material without any falsification of
data; he hopes that the uncertainty of the material balance (mainly
caused by the uncertainty of the measurements) will cover such a
diversion.
One has to realize that the first diversion strategy exists only because
of the special verification scheme adopted by the safeguards authority.
Ife.g.the inspector would notuse the operator's data but try to elose
the material balance only with the help of his own data there would be no
sense for the operator to falsify data , Addi tionally, i t should be realized
that this procedure refers only to the detection of a diversion of declared
material, i.e. material which enters the plant in a declared way. The de-
tection of the misuse of the plant is not an objective of the verification
scheme described above.
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As a consequence of these considerations, the analysis will consist
of two main parts
(i) The analysis of the data verification problem. Here, the question
of the optimal allocation of inspection effort to different
classes of material is central.
(ii) The analysis of the material balance problem. As the question of
the allocation of the inspector's effort is more important in the
case of data verification, here the question of the appropriate
significance threshold is central. Effort questions come into the
picture in form of boundaries: Number of inventories per year,
quality of measurements, number of repeated measurements, frequency
of calibrations.
In the following treatment the second case will be treated first. One cou1d
argue that the data verification problem shou1d be treated first as only
after a satisfying comparison of data the material balance will be closed
with the help of the data of the operator •.. However, as the material balance
gives the frame for the data verification procedure, this problem will be
treated first. One may say that the analysis of the material balance problem
alone is equivalent to the assumption that all the data are verified by the
inspector ('100 % coverage'), i.e. that there exists no possibility of divert-
ing material and covering it by appropriate data fa1sification.
If one takes into account data falsification strategies one has to consider
two different cases:
(i) It i s possible to verify reported data of measurements some time
after these da ta have been generated. This is e.g. the case for
chemical analyses if the samples can be stored up to the end of a
campaign.
(ii) It is possible only to verify reported data imrnediately after they
have been generated. This is the case for volume or weight deter-
minations of batches which go into the process and therefore, loose
their identity.
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The respective statistical procedures have to take into consideration the
fact that in case (i) one can find a falsified datum in the sample even
if the sample size is smaller than 100 i. whereas in case (ii) this is
not possible as the operator - if he falsifies data at all - always will
falsify those data which are not verified. However, also in this case there
exists a possibility to detect a falsification.
In order to be able to make a statement on the guaranteed probability of
detection one has to determine the minimum of the probability of detection
with respect to all possible diversion strategies. On the other hand one
has to determine that distribution of safeguards effort which maximizes the
probability of detection. As has heen discussed already earlier /2/ this
procedure is equivalent to a game theoretical treatment inthe framework
of a two-person zero~sum game with the probability of detection as the payoff
to the inspector.
Up to now it had been assumed that the overall probability of detection for
the period of one year is the only criterion of optimization. However t there
1s also the objective of having the detection time as short as possible.
As a detection of a diversion can be achieved only at the end of an inventory
period, the length of the inventory period determines the detection time.
For economical reasons one can have not more than two inventory periods per
year in most of the plants of the nuclear fuel cycle therefore, in the follow-
ing the detection time is considered ~o be a boundary rather than an objective
which is expressed in the number of inventory periods per year.
In the following, a short description of the relevant methods and formulae will
be given. The mathematical proofs will not be presented here as they have been
already published elsewhere.
-]-
2. Verification of the material balance
2.1 One inventory period
In the following the time interval (to' t 1) is considered. At the time
point t a physical inventory is taken; as a result the amount I of
o 0
material may be found in the plant. In the interval of time (to' t l)
the
material throughput (input minus output) mayamount to the value D
I
thus,




At the point of time t l again a physical inventory is taken; as a result
the amount 1
1
of material may be found.
In case of no diversion of material in the interval of time (to' tl)both,
the book and the physical inventory should have the same value. Because of
measurement errors there may be a difference thus the question arises whether
or not the diffecrence between the book and the physical inventory which is
called 'Material Unaccounted For (MUF)':
= B - II 1 (2.2)
is significant. This means that a significance test has to be performed
where the null hypothesis H is given by the statement 'no diversion' and
o
the alternative hypothesis H
I
by the statement 'diversion of the amount MI




, aD1 and all be the variances of the random variables physical in-
ventory at to' throughput during (to' [I) and physical inventory at t 1• Then
the variance of MUF is given by
(2.3)
independent of the fact whether or not a diversion will be tried. Therefore,
the significance test may be defined in the following way:
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Null hypothesis: E(MUFI/Ho) = 0
Alternative hypothesis: E(MUF1/H 1) = MI
(2.4)
Let sI be the significance threshold of the test. Then the statement





Here, two kinds of false statements are possible:
(i) The inspector states 'H is correct' where in fact H is correct1 0
(false alarm; error of the first kind)
(ii) The inspector states 'H is correct' where in fact HI is correct0
(error of the second kind).
The probabilities for cOnlmitting these errors are called Qt andß1 :
(2.5)
I-BI is called probability of detection.
In case the random variables 1
0
, DI and 1 1 are normal distributed one has
sI


















In eq. (2.6 b) the significance threshold SI can be eliminated with the
help of (2.6a); one obtains
MI
]-ß I = ~(- - U l-a )
C1 I ]
(2.7)
where U is the inverse function of the normal distribution function.
2.2 Two inventory periods
2.2.1 Formulation of ehe problem
It is common opinion now that in the case of large nuclear plants no more
than two physical inventories shall be taken per year because of the effort
connected with this procedure. As furthermore, the reference interval of
time should he one year, one has to consider now the problem of a sequence
of two inventories and the decision theoretical problems connected therewith.
Two problems arise fram the side of the inspector:
C) In which way should the starting Lnventory for the second inventory1..
period be chosen if the physical inventory at the end of the first
inventory period is not exactly known?
(ii) In which way should the two significance thresholds for the two MUF-
values be chosen if a boundary in form of a fixed false alarm rate
for the two inventory periods, i.e. for the reference interval of
time is given?
Additionally, there arises a third problem which also can be called the
problem of the operator who wants to divert material: If it is assumed that
the amount M of material shall be diverted in the reference interval of time,
what is the optimal distribution of diversion on the two inventory periods
(MI' M2: Mr+Mz = M)? The inspectorhastodetermine this optimal distribution,
too, in order not to overestimate his probability of detection.
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2.2.2 Starting inventory for the second inventory period
it is assumed that at the end of the first inventory period the ~ruF was
not significant. Then the inspector can use either the ending book or
physical inventory as the starting inventory for the second inventory
pe rdod ,
According to a proposal of Stewart /3/ a linear combination of these two












2The variance of S, Os is given by the relation
(2. 10)
From this relation one can take that the variance of this estimate S is
smaller than the variance of both the book and the physical inventory.
This choice of the estimate of the starting ~inventory has further conse-
quences. In order to explain these the two material balances to be closed




Under the alternative hypcthesis HI, i.e. under the assumption that the operator
diverts in the first inventorv period the amount Mt. in the second the amount
. - I .
M
2,
the probability l-ß to detect at least one diversion is given by the relation
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(2.12a)
From this relation one obtains the overall false alarm probability a, i.e.
the probability of detection under the null hypothesis H (no diversion)
o
(2.12b)
Now the problem arises that the two random variables MUF 1 and MUF2
are
in general not independent as in the starting inventory components of the
first random variables occur.However, if one chooses the starting inventory
in the way described above, one has
cov(MUF I' MUF2) = 0 (2. 13)
If one assumes furthermore that all components are normal distributed one
obtains the result that the random variables MUF 1 and MUF2 are independent.
This means that one obtains from (2.12) and (2.13) the relations
s = prob {MUF 1 ~ sI} ·prob {MUF2 ~ s2}





prob {MUF. < s./H } = I-a., i = 1,2
~ - ~ 0 ~
one obtains from eq. (2.14a)
I-a = (I-a )(I-a )
1 2
(2.15)
In order to be able to calculate these probabilities one has to deterrnine
the expectation values and variances of HUFI and MUFZ under the null and the
alternative hypothesis.






In ease of the alternative hypothesis the varianees var(lIDF 1) and var(MUF2)
are the same as before. The expeetation value of MUF 1 is given by
(2.17a)
The expeetation value of MUF 2 is not only M2 as apart of MI oeeurs in the
seeond inventory period beeause of the ehoiee of the starting inventory.
The result of the ealeulation whieh shall not be given here is
(2. 17b)
Here, a is given by eq. 2.9.
As has been assumed already earlier all random eomponents are assumed to be
normal distributed therefore, MUF I and MUF2 are normal distributed with
expeetation values and varianees given by eqs. (2.16) and (2.17), and the
overall probability of deteetion in the ease of the diversion of the amount
M = M
t+M2 of material ean be ealeulated with the help of eq. (2.14b). The
result is
(2. 18)
2.2.3 Decision theoretieal analysis
As has been mentioned already in section 2.2.1 the problem arises now to
'distribute '01 ando2 in suchaway thatanoverall falsealarmprobability o
aceording to relation 2.t5 is guaranteed. Furthermore, the inspector wants to
determine the guaranteed probability of detection with respect to the total
diversion H = Ht+HZ• This means that he has to consider that distribution










On the other hand, the operator who has the intention to divert material
will try this in an optimal way; he will choose Ml,M2 such that he obtains













Here again the boundary conditions (2.20) have to be observed. The behaviour
of the two 'players' corresponds to the behaviour of two players in a so-
called zero-sum game (where the gain of one player is the loss of the other
and inversely). A justification for the fact that the probability of the
error of the second kind is chosen as the payoff is given in Ref. /2/.
Both players cannot do anything better than choosing their strategies in
such a way that ß = ßi ,i.e. they have to look for a saddle point.guar : guar
Without going into the rather complicated analysis with respect to the existence
of saddlepoints /4/, the results which are interesting in this connection sha11
be reported here.
As can be seen from the constraints (2.20) one can replace the function




The resülts concerning ihe existence and characterisation of a saddlepoint
of the functionB(a
l
,M1) are listed beLow,
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Let a be arbitrary 0 < a < 1•
1• It exists a unique1y determined sadd1epoint of ß(a l, MI) for every M > O.
2. Let (Ci" I ,MI) be the sadd1epoint of ß(a1,MI). Then MI > 0, o < a} < Cl
3. The point (Clt, M) is the sadd1epoint of s (c l' MI) if
Cl s(ä
l




, M) = min s (a I' M)
O~al~a
ho1ds.
4. The point (Cl
I





5. No other types of saddlepoints than those characterized by (3.) and (4.)
exist.
6. If ?'_ max a;-), then the saddlepoint is of type (4.) for all M.
2
This fact is important because ä
1
(Le. the optimal inspector strategy)
is in this case. independent of M (the total amount assumed to be diverted).
This can be seen immediate1y from (4.), because the equation for the de-
termination of ~I_ does not invo1ve MI and M.
!-) holds e.g. in the case
°2
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2.2.4 Treatment of systematic errors whichcannot be described by
variances
In the case that the systematic errors are not of random origin or are
fixed throughout the reference time (and can not be described by variances
therefore) equation (2. 18) for the probability of non-detection must be
modified.
Let us assume that the measurements 10,11,12,DI,D2 are composed in the fo110w-
ing way:
I = I + e + s0 -0 0 0
1
1 = I + e l + sI-I
12 = .!.2 + e2 + 8 2
DI = D1 + e3 + s3
D2 = D2 + e4 + 8 4
Rere ther. ,D. aze the t rue val.ue s , e . the random measurement errors (with
-1 -1 1
expectation-va1ue zero) and the s. are the unknown but fixed va1ues of the
1
systematic errors.
We further assume that the Si are confined to finite intervalls J i, i.e.
s.tJ., l.<m where 1. is the length of J .•
11 11
Then the probability of non-detection ß is bounded by
(a(10+13)+(!~a)11+12+14),
MI aM 1+M2s ~ HU(I-al)+T 1- a)·4>(U(I-a 2)+T2- 0 )
1 2
where T = _1_ (1 +1
1+13
) , T =--
0 1 0 02
(2.21)





ß = minguar (2.22)
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By use of the constraints the right side of (2.21) can be expressed by
(2.23)
o < a <
o < M.
One can show that (al' MI) is a saddlepoint if and only if one of the follow-
ing three conditions does hold
a) HI = M and Ss (~I ' M) = min Ss (a I ,M)
O:;"a}:;"a
b) MI 0 and Ss (;1' 0) = min Ss (a I ,0)
O;;"a I:;"a
c) Ss (~I ,M) = max Ss(;I' MI)
O;;"MI~M




1. U11-a )2 l-a 2 1 O.e 1 --·0 e =2 02 I()-a I)
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3. Verifieati6n of data
3.1 D-statisties for one elass of material
In the following a set of N data is eonsidered whieh has been reported in
the eourseof a eampaign, and it is assumed that it is possible to verify
these data by means of independent measurements at the end of the eampaign.
Let x., j = I •••N, be the measurement result for the material content of
J
the j-th bateh reported by the operator. Let furthermor~ yj' j = I ••• n, be
the result of the independent measurement of the inspeetor. It is assumed
that the measurement errors are normal distributed with expeetation value
zero; the varianees of the random (r) and systematie (s) errors of the
• 2 2 2 2
operator's (0) and 1nspeetor's (I) measurements are 00r ' 00s' 0Ir' 0Is'
In order to make a statement whether the data of the operator are eorreet






j= I J J
(3. I)
that means he verifies only those data reported by the operator whieh he
has measured himself - the reason for this is that by means of this proeedure
the influenee of the variation of the true material eontents of the batches
is eliminated.
Under the null hypothesis H , i.e. under the assumption
o
by the operator are falsified the expeetation
. •• (. h 2g1ven by the follow1ng express10ns . W1t 0r =
that no data reported





Under the alternative hypothesis H1, i.e. under the assumption that r of the





var(D/H I ) = :oD/H
I
lJ·r = : H
2
2° r 2 2= N (- + 0+11'n s
r N-r (2.- 2. . n- I ) )
N • N n n N-I (3.3)
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In Fig. 1.1 some examples for the standard deviation 0n/R are given.
It is to be seen in which way the standard deviation is Increased compared
to the standard deviation in the case of no data falsification if the sample
size becomes small.
With the help of the D-statistics the inspector decides whether he takes the
null hypothesis to be true or not~ If D is greater than a given significance
threshold he decides that the alternative hypothesis is true (more exactly
that anything is wrong). The significance threshold is fixed by the choice
of theprobability of the error of the first kind
a : = prob { D > sIR }o (3.4)
As in the foregoing chapter the test is characterized by the probability of
detection (one minus the error of the second kind ß):
s = prob { D~s/RI } 0.5)
If one eliminates in this formula the significance threshold with the help of a,
one obtains from (3.1), see Ref. /5/
min(n,r)
ß = L ~(Ul-a
k:::max(O,n+r-N)
Rere, ° is given by




This formula can be used, e.g. forthe determination of the sample size n
in case all the other parameters including a and ß are given.
A computer program for it is given in Tables la and Ib.
As formula (3.6) represents a very complicated formula it is interesting
to have a simple approximate fOrffiula. If one assumes the random variable D
to be normal distributed with the expectation values and variances given
by eqs , (3.2) and (3.3) one has instead of eq.(3.6)
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(3.7)
The quality of the approximation can be taken from Figs. 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
In these figures the exact and the approximate distribution functions are
represented graphically. As can be taken from the figures the approximation
is the better, the higher n and rare; however, the influence of n is stronger
than that of r: see, e.g. the cases (n, r) = (49,5) and (n, r) = (5,49)
respectively.
The question arises what value of ~ the operator will choose. This value
cannot be arbitrarily large, e.g. because there exists a batch-to-batch-
variation which is known to the inspector (which means that the amount falsi-
fied cannot be larger than the batch-to-batch-variation). If the operator
wants to divert the amount M = ~.r, it follows from eq. (3.3) that the variance
takes its maximum if r is as small and ~ is as large as possible thus, this is
the best choice in the framework of the approximation (3.7). However, this must
not be so if one works with the exact formula as can be seen fram Fig. 1.5.
Generally, one can say that it is best from the point of view of the operator
that
(i) r should be as small as possible ifM is 1arge cornpared to the
standard deviation of the sum of the measurement errors of a11
N batches
(ii) r should be as large as possible if M is sma11 cotllpared to the
standard deviation of the sum of the measurement errors of a11
N batches.
Instead of adding all data of one c1ass and comparing the sums of the operator's
reported data and the inspectors o~~ findings, the inspector can also check
th.e repQrtE!d data by c:ompa'['~ng thE! singlE! <l?ta of each batch. This method
however, has the disadvantage that it is not possible to give an analytical
expression which takes into account the effect of systematic errors. If one
neglects systematic errors one obtains for the probability of an error of the
second kind instead of formula (3.6) the following expression
-20-
1- 5-
min(n, r) k n
s = L (~(U Vi="a - ~» (t-a)
k=max(O,n+r-N)
(3.8)
Here, 0 is given by
2o
It is possible to give exarnples for the case that this statistical procedure
is better than the D-statistics. As however, in many cases the D-statistics
is more effective and as furthermore, in the case of the D-statistics the
effect of systematic errors can be taken into account in a very natural way,
only the latter procedure will be used in the following.
3.2 D-statistics for several classes of material
2
In case of R different classes of material wi th different parameters Ni' u i' 0 i
the operator forms according to eq. (3.1) the following expression
R N. n .
D - r 1 r1 ( y .• -x.• )
i-t ni jat 1J 1J
(3.9)
The expectation values and variances of the random variable Dunder the null










2 2 r , N.-r. 1 1 ni-to + ll.' 1 1 1 ( »
si 1 N. N. n . n.~ N.-}
1 1 111
=
- L~. ·r.... :M
.11- -- 1
-2]-
The distribution function of the random variable D cannot be given in a
closed analytical form. An approximation on the basis of the assumption that
D is normal distributed is used in the following; with this approximation one
obtains a form for the error of the second kind which corresponds exactly to
eq , (3.7).
Two problems now arise
(i) l~at is the necessarv effort for the verification of the data of,
the R classes of material?
(ii) What is the optimal distribution of a given effort on the R different
cLas se s ,
As has been mentioned already in the introduction it is necessary for the
answer of these questions to perform agame theoretical analysis with the
probability of detection as the payoff to the inspector. The set of strategies
of the inspector is the set of possibilities to choose the sample sizes
n. i = I .•• R, such that the boundary condition
~ , .
C > L&.n.
- • ~ L
~
(3-1 I)
is met where C is the inspection effort available and E. the effort to verify
~
a datum of the i-th class.
The set of strategies of the ope~ator is the set of possibilities to choose
the sample sizes r , ,i = 1, •• R, such that
1.
+) (3-11' )
It follows from the fact that the distribution function of D cannot be determined
analytically that there does not exist an analytical solution of the problem.
+)~ben in the following by applying the Lagrange multipliers technique
and r. are treated as continuous variables, then instead of (3-11),






In Ref 15/, an exact solution has been given for the
special CBse that both players - operator and inspector -
decide independently and without knowing from each other
to choose only one class for their activities. The optimal
strategies were mixed strategies where the respective classes
are choosen at random according to a weIl defined random
distribution. Although this case is very interesting from
a theoretical point of view, especially with respect to the
problem of the propagation and choice of false alarm proba-
bility, it will not be considered here.
If one takes the normal approximation to be'valid and if one further-
more assumes that M is large compared to UI-a·OD/Ho one can take the
variance O~/H eq , (3-10) as the payoff to the operator as the proba-:
bility of detJction is a monotone function of that quantity.ln fact, it
was the proposal of Stewart /61 to take that quantity as the criterion
of optimization for the inspector's strategy.
Stewart took the variance (3-10) in the formula
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1 1(- - --»n , N.
~ ~
(3-12)
and minimized it with respect to the n. under the boundary
~
condition (3-11). The result, obtained with the help of the
method of Lagrange multipliers, was
c S. s~ N~ 2 2
r. N.-r.










With respect to the r. he did not perform an optimization;
1.
he gave an estimate of the 'relative frequencies of diversion
r r
(-1 R), An example is shown in Fig. 1.6 and 1.7 where two
NI··· NR •
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classes of Stewart's example have been taken,and where
the optimization with respect to both variables has been
perf'o rmed ,
The numerical example is
I N. 0 ri lJ • E: •1 1 1
1 200 0.327 1.44 28
2 60 0.382 1.50 30
As one can take from the figures the optimal choice of the
number of batches to be falsified is far from Stewart's esti-
mate however, the maximum of the standard deviation and the
minimum of the probability of detection does not differ very
much from Stewart' s estimate.
As it is not possible to perform the maximization of the variance (3-13) with
respect to the r., i = I••• R, one either has to do it numerically or to make
1.
further approximations.
In reference /5/ the following assumptions have been made
(i) « n i , r.
« N. i = 1, ••• , R1 1
(ii) 2 /
2 i 1, ••• , R0 n. «0 ..r. 1 s.
1 1





R 2 2 2 r.L (N.o +N.U.~)
• 1 1 S. 1 1 n.
1= 1 1
(3-14)
Treating n. and r. as continuous variables the saddlepoint coordinates of
1 1
the e~ression(3-14) can be calculated by the method of the Lagrange
multipliers:
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0 e N. I L.n. = . • lJ i N·E:·lJ· (3-14a)1 1 J J J
J
0 M • N. I I N.E·lJ·r. = . E' (3-14b)1 1. 1. J J J J
Inserting these values in (3-14) yields
R
(N. 2 (1 ~ Mmin max var (D/R
l) "" .L +- N. E. lJ.)n. r. 1. 81. e 1. 1. 1.1. 1. 1.= 1 (3-14c)
N.E.lJ.) ..1. 1. 1.
of the standard deviation and the optimal
detection are calculated for the example used








In Fig. 1 .8 the optima
guaranteed probabilityof
for Fig. 1 .6 and !. 7. The
the approximation (3-14) which has been used in the form
2 2N.o .1. r1.




As can be taken from the figure, the approximation works quite well if
l<n.< N. which had to be assumed for the derivation of (3-14).1. 1.
In order to have things not too complicated the approximate decision theoretical
solution will always be used, even in cases where the assumtions do not hold
very welle As a justification for this the fact will be taken that even if one
~y b~ not too near to the optimal strategy the optimal probability of detection
may be not too far from the solution gained by the approximation.
In this way the question of the optimal allocation of effort shall be answered.
The question of the necessary total effort shall be answered in the same way
as inthe c:ase_of~tl!Y one class of material:
If all parameters including M, a and ß for the optimal case are fixed one can




c l ? 1. rl. (U l-e+Ul-a) + Ul-ß J (3-14d)= i 1. 1. 1. ).1.1. 1.
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A further approach is given in the following.
We take the variance I.n the form (3-12) + systematic error, i.e.
N~ 2











or. =I.Now we de f i.ne
oObviously r ,
I.
oand lJ .I. fulfill
Hith the method of the Lagrange multipliers, ne gIec t i.ng a2./n. , one obtains
rI. 1
the optimal n. by
1





and 0\1. er tJ •
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er •.'« , ~
s 1 ] J
as defined above, one gets
In the case that M > -21 • \' u. N.= f 1 1.
1.
holds it can easily be shown that
the value (3-15c) is an upper bound forthe expression min max var (DIRI)'
var (D/H1)given ni r i
by ( 3- 15) , M = \' 11 rL."i i
i
C = l E. n.
i I. I.
That means that when taking the variance in the form (3-15c) one always
lies on che safe side when Md· L lJ. N. ho Lds ,
-.. . I. I.
1
In the figure 1.9 the standard deviation and the optimal guaranteed
probability of detection are calculated with the data of Stewart's
numerical example (taking a. = 0).
S1
A disadvantage of all these methods presented above is thefact that when
using the method of the Lagrange multipliers the obvious constraints
n. < N. , r. < N. where never taken into account.(The theorems which
1= 1 1= 1
are available for the Lagrange multipliers method with inequality constraints
-26-
yielded no analytical solutions for the problems regarded here).
oTherefore it may happen that n.
1.
cases the correct but somewhat
> N. or r~ > N. holds. In these
1. 1. 1.
arduous procedure would be to use the discrete
dynamic optimization techniques.
Another proposal for the approach (3-15) (3-15c) is sketched here:




n , ,u=I, ••• ,U,
1.v
I , ••• , V, where 0 N. 0 N.v = n. > n. <
1. 1.u 1. 1.U V V
0 U










The 0 then calculated by minimizing the eXpressionnew n. are






V V V V
under the constraints C'= L e: • n. M' = I lJ. r.1. 1. , 1. 1.v-I v v v=I v v
according to the method discribed in (3-15) - (3-15c).
fulfill theoThis procedure can berepeated dU aU the so cakcul ared n ,
1.
constraints n~ < N. , i=I, ••• ,R.
1. 1.
It must be mentioned however, that these n~ must not necessarily yield
1.
min var (D/RI) but may give a too pessimistic, i.e. a too large value forn.
tlfe variance.
3.3 Modified D-statistics
In the foregoing treatment it had been assumed that in case cf a falsification
of data from one or more classes of material the inspector can find in his
sampie batches the data of which are falsified. There are however, caseswhere
-27-
the inspeetor never ean find falsified batehes by means of this sampling
teehnique.
An example for this ease is a sequenee of input batehes in a reproeessing
plant. The eoneentration analyses ean be verified at the end of a eampaign
if the samples ean be s t.ored , Therefore, the inspeetor has the chance to
deteet falsified analyses even if he verifies only apart of the data. The
volume data however, ean only be verified as kmg as the batehes are available.
In these eases it is elear that the operator - if at all - will falsify only
data of those batehes whieh are not verified by the inspeetor. Falsifieation
of this kind ean be deteeted by the inspeetor if he eompares the sum of his
own data with the sum of all operator data 151.
In the caSe of ohe class of batches the inspector has to form the quantity
n N







Unstead of (3. i)). Thismeans he has to use a.11 repozted data of the
operator, eontrary to the ease diseussed before.
The expeetation values of this new D-statisties in ease of no diversion (null
hypothesis Ho) and in ease of the diversion M (alternative hypothesis H1) and
the varianees are given by









2 I~ a~r + ~ air + o;s + ais + (~ - #)a; J
Bere, 2 is the ba.tch-rto-rba t ch variation,a 1.e.v
2 1
N N
e = L (w.-W)2 I Lv N - W= w. (3. 18)
i= I 1 N i=1 1
where l-l. is the true material eontent of the i-th b a t ch ,
1.
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If one assumes that also the true values are normal distributed one can
construct a significance test; the probability of detection is given as
usually by the expression
(3.19)
In the case of R different classes of batches there arise problems because
it is not always correct to form the difference D between the sums of the
inspector and operator data.
If one considers the classes of input and output measurements,
the operator will in case of a falsification report too small
values for the first, to~ large values for the second class,
thus the sum of the differences may cancel partially or com-
pletely. In this case the inspector should form the difference
of the differences. However, there are also cases possible
where this procedure does not work.
As a consequence the only meaningful procedure seems to be the establishment
and test of all possible sums and differences of class-differences.
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If one considers the variables n. approximately to be continuous variables
~
one can treat this problem with the help of Lagrange multipliers. Then the
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i = I •• R (3.22)
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4. Conclusion
Three possible modes of diversion in connection with the material balance
verification have been considered in the foregoing chapters:
(i) Diversion by simply taking off material and hoping that the
unaccuracy of the material balance covers this diversion
(chapter 2)
(ii) Diversion by falsification of data which are verified by means
of the DI-statistics (chapter 3. 1,2)
(iii) Diversion by falsification of data which are verified by means
of the D2-statistics (chapter 3.3)
The overall probability of detection I-ß per year in case of two inventory
periods per year and in case of the total amount M to be diverted per year
(aiternative hypothesis H1) is given by t.he relation
(4. I)
Accordingly the overall false alarm probability n per year in case of no
diversion (null hypothesis H) is given by the relationo
(4.2)
Naturally, the question arises to proceed in a way analogous to the
foregoing considerations and to
(i) maximize ß with respect to a set (MI' M2, M3, M4)
according to the different diversion possibilities such
that the sum
takes a predetermined value.
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(ii) minimize ß with respect to the distribution of effort and
furthermore ~ith respect to the distribution of false alarm
probabilities a. such that a predetermined overall false
i.
alarm probability a according to eq. (4.2) is guaranteed.
Obviously this program is by far too complicated to be carried through
analytically.
One point has to be made first: The effort for the performance of DI-statistics
is measured in costs (for analyses), the effort for the performance of the
D2-statistics is measured in inspector man-days in the plant. In principle,
one could translate the latter effort into costs, too, however, as the number
of inspector man-days in the plant is an important quantity for other reasons,
these two measures for effort should be kept separated. This means that in the
case one deviates from the 100 % coverage (where the two D-statistics play no
role) the reduction of effort has to be considered in terms of the two para-
meters cost and man-days; this means furthermore, that no optimization between
the b~o kinds of D-statistics has to be performed.
A severe problem is represented by the fact that the different random components
in eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 are not independent because the same measurements are used
~n the case of the data verification as weIl as in the case of the material
balance establishment. As there exists in the moment no method to treat this
problem analytically and as because of the complexity of the problem that the
different dependencies cancel each other at least partially eqs. (4. I) and
(4.4) are without further argumentation written in the form
From (4.4) one obtains









are the false alarm probabilities for the two D-statistics.
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Having the problem formulated ~n this way one could proceed ~n the following
lyay
(i) A certain effort in form of costs for analysis and inspector
man-days in the plant is fixed.
(ii) The error second kind probability ß accodding to eq. (4.3)
is maximized with respect to the variables H1+H2, }13' M4,
such thatthe surn
takes a value fixed before.
(iii) This maximized error second kind probability ß is minimized with
respect to the false alarm probabilities a
l,aZ,a 3
such that the
boundary condition (4.5) is fulfilled for a p,iven a.
These optimization procedures are to be understood in such a way that the
'internal optimizations' which were the subject of the foregoing papers are
carried through before.
Although this procedure seems to be very reasonable from the mathematical
point of view there is also the argument of'practicability'. This means that
one should not develop too complicated formulae as they will cause difficul-
ties in the application. Therefore, from a practical point of view one should
choose a = a = a = 1- 3;1-a
1 2 3
(4.6)
and calculate the error second kind probability ß, eq. 4.3, for this alternative
hypothesis and a given effort. However, it should be tried, at least numerically,
to figure out in what extent one deviates from the saddlepoint if one pro-
ceeds this way.
A final remark shall be made to the question of the global parameters: false
alarms probability, total amount M to be diverted and effort (the global
probability of detection is considered here as the determinant).
-32-
The global false alarm probability could be treated in principle as a
deterIDinant, too /5/, but for practical reasons one wants to treat it
as a boundary thus, it is fixed before. (The same holds for the number
of inventory periods per reference time which could be considered as the
fifth global parameter.)
The total amount M assumed to be diverted per reference time has been
subject of broad discussions; it seems best to vary this in order to have
a feeling for 'reasonable' amounts. The single amounts M. which refer to
1
the single diversion strategies are determinants thus, the question of their
values which had been raised at the beginning of this study is answered in
this context.
The effort necessary for a single plant is only fixed in brond terms; there-
fore, it seems to be reasonable to vary this quantity, too.
As a result of these considerations the optimization study should end in a
figure where t.he opt imi zed probability cf detecticl1 l-ß isplotted versus
the total amount M assumed to be diverted, with the effort (costs plus in-
spector man-days) as parameter.
-33-
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Fig.1.1 Graphical representation of the standard deviation of the
0- statistic under the alternative hypothesis H1 ,
CI? 2 2 r N- r 1 1 n -1 )1/2
d 0/H1 =N . (n + d 5 + ~ . N .N'(n -n' N-1 )
as a function of n for different values of rand N and
~ =1.44 I d r =0.3271, 0'5 =0.1
-39-
10 1.0
tFO(x) -: --- /




0.6 / - 0.6 n=49/ n= 5 I/ I/
I/
1/ I0.4 0.4




0.0 I I I 0.0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 20 40 60 80
tO~-7" -- I 1.0~(1
~
r ~ F (X)1./FO(x)
1 0+ 1 00.8 ///













80 100 120 0 20 40 60 80
Fig. 1. 2 Oistribution function FO(x) of the O-statistics ,
mir, (n.r )
FO (x) = L <I>





and its approximation by the normal distribution (dashed curves)
2for N =200, ~ =1.44 , dr =0.002, d s =0, r =5 and
different values of n.
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Fig.l.5 Probability of the error of the second kind ,
( r) (N- r)__1_ . Li) 1 n -I
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for fixed M =~ .r as a function of r, with n



















































Fig.1.6 Standard deviation I optimized with respect
to the inspector's strategy.
d 2 = 1. (~VF7:"'. S' )2 _~ ~. !L. Ni - rj
D/Hl C i e, I i I-! I Ni Ni
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where Si = Ni (o'q +I-!j Ni Ni
as a tunetion of number of talsitied batches q in the tirst da 55,
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Fig.1.7 Probability of detection p =<l> ( O'~ D/Ho)
D/Hl
es a function of number of falsified batches rl in the first
dass, with eftort C as parameter ( Cmax =7400 I
M =23.4 , of. = O. OS )
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Fig. 1.8 Optimum of the standard deviation and optimal guaranteed probability
of detection as a function of total effort tor M=23.4, o: =0.05.
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Fig.1.9 Optirncl guaranteed probabitity of detection end standard deviation as a function
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Chapter 11
-47-
Data Collection for the Reference Plants
1• 1 Plant Data
1.1.1 General (Site, flow scheme, capacity)
The West Valley plant of Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) is about 30 miles
south of Buffalo, New York. The plant reprocesses spent fue! elements
on the basis of the Purex solvent extraction process. A flow scheme
of the plant is given in Fig. 2.1.
The capacity /1/ of the plant is 300 t low enriched uranium per year
(in the form of 10\01 enriched U02 or U metal) • This means 1000 kg low
enriched uranium per day, if one takes 300 working days per year.
Altematively the plant is able to process:
500 kg U plus Th/day; or
800 kg U-Me alloy/day; or
400 kg U-Zr and U-Al plus cladding/day
The capacity is different from the actual average throughput (see section 1.5).
For the purposes of this work only the cost of uranium. processing is
considered.
1.1.2 Input /1/
The spent fuel elements to be processed must be cooled 150 days before
processing.
The base line process is thought for low enriched U02 in stainless steel
or Zr alloy tubes. With only modification of the head-end treatment
natural uranium fue! clad in al~m;nium can be processed.
The element to be processed is first removed from the storage-pool ean,
plaeed in a fixture on the inspeetion table and marked for sawing. The
element is then transferred to the saw table; the serap metal cutoff is
taken in serap buekets to the general-purpose eell for eventual burial.
The fuel bundle is pushed by a ram out of its easing into a shear-feed
magazine, and the magazine is transferred to the shear. The ehopped fuel
is diseharged through a ehute into baskets in the GPG.
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The chopping operation, which can be operated manually or automatically can
be carried out in an inert atmosphere by purging feed magazine, shear chamber,
discharge chute and hydraulically driven chamber. The hydraulically-driven
shear is automatically stopped by a detector sensing when the chopped-fuel
basket is filled. Another detector stops the shear in case of a jam in the
disc;harge chute.
Chopped-fuel baskets are loaded into the dissolver in the GPG by a crane.
The amounts of fuel and acid charged to the dissolver are adjusted to yield
a U-235 concentration that is approximately 50 % of the critical concentration.
The solution is mixed byan air sparger and heated by steam. Dissolution
is completed in less than 12 hours, as indicated by levelling out of off-
gas pressure, temperature and specific gravity. Recorders and alarms are
also provided ror liquid level, pot temperature and pressure. Steam to
the heating jacket is shut off and cooling water is introduced to the
dissolver automatically if the dissolver approaches atmoshperic pressure.
Off-gases given off during dissolution are put through a scrubher, then
heated to 200
0 e and the iodine absorbed on silver-nitrate-coated Barl
saddles. The gas is cooled, filtered, added to the general ventilation
system, filtered further and discharged to the stack.
Dissolver solution and rinses are collected in the accountability and feed-
adjustment tank (3D-I), which is equipped with heating and cooling coils,
condenser, air sparger, liquid-level and specific-gravity instruments.
Tank contents can be adjusted to feed specifications by evaporation or the
addition of cold chemicals.
1.1.3 Product /4/
Low enrichedU-product (uranium nitrate) is loaded into a tank trailer
and shipped in quantities of about 4.2 metric tons of uranium per shipment.
(High enriched U-product is collected in glass raschig ring product vessels
and loaded into IO-litre bottles which are packed in birdcages for shipment.)
The recovered Pu-product (plutonium nitrate) is stored in geometrically safe
tanks from which it is loaded into lO-litre bo t t l.es , Pu is packaged in
birdcages in a manner similar tohigh enriched U. Each IO-litre bottle
contains about 2-3 kg of Pu. Shipments of Pu are scheduled when either
20 or more bottles of packaged product are in storage or at the end of
each campai gn ,
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1.1.4 Losses. Recycling
Two types of losses are considered here:
(i) Liquid waste;
(ii) Hull Losses.
(Solid waste from the laboratory etc. is not considered to be of
importance in this connection.)
From Ref. /3/, Vol. I, page 45 (Table 3.8) and /6/, page 8, it is
assumed that following nurnbers are representative: Total losses anount
to 1 % of input; liquid waste 0.9 i. of input; hull losses 0.1 % of input.
The amount of material which is recycled in the course of acid recycling
can be neglected.
1.1.5 Representative campaigns, batch data
Actual NFS campaign data are available in references /3/, /4/, /5/ and
/7/. On the basis of these data representative batch data have been
developed which are given in Table 2.1 through Table 2.3.
Here, one campaign corresponds to one third of a core of a 1000 HWe Ll..JR.
This corresponds to i20 elements or 120 80 pins.
One basket filled with chopped pins corresponds to one dissolver filling
which amounts to 4-5 fuel elements.
1. 1.6 Inventory
Upper and lower limits of the Pu inventory during a running campaign
are given in Fig. 2.3.
By means of rough estimates of the Pu content of the different tanks one
can estimate the Pu inventory of the plant with an accuracy of about 10 %.
The so-called in-process inventory determination nethod which uses an
isotopic step function of the fissile material to be processed does not
work very weH in the case of the NFS plant as the Pu product tanks are
too large. Thus, the step function disappears.
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The only accurate method to determine the inventory of the plant is
to perform a flush-out after the end of a campaign. According to
different references /3/, /8/ it is assumed that the Pu inventory after
a campaign amounts to about I kg Pu which is washed out and which is
measured in the form of waste batches ,
As there remains always a certain amount of Pu in the plant (plating
out, etc.) it is assumed that the Pu inventory after the end of a
campaign can be determined with an accuracy of ~ I kg Pu (100 %).
The Pu gained in the course of the inventory taking is obtained in the
form oflO batches with 1000 I, each containing 100 g Pu. This Pu is
measured 1ike Pu product (amperometric titration). Vo1urne is rneasured
with the dip tube system.
The U inventory amounts to about 10 kg and can be measured with an
accuracy of + 1 kg.
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1.2 Measurement System, Methods and Sampling Points
Input accountability
Input is measured in the input accountability tank (3 D-l) by means of
- volume determination (dip-tube system)
- concentration determination of a sample.
Additionally, the density is determined as the concentration is given
~n g Pu(U)/g solution. However, as long as the density of the solution
~n the tank is the same as in the sample one must not take into account
the error of the den~ity determination.
U product (/4/, p. 4)
The low eriri'ched trrarri um pröduct; is s arap Led in tank 5 V.... I. The product;
loadout quantities are based upon the net weight of the product solution
and the sample results.
Pu product (/4/, p. 4)
The sa~)les for product specifications and plutonium concentration
analysis are drawn form the product storage tank (5 D-5 A,B). The
product loadout quantities are based on the net product solution weight
and the reported assay values.
It is to be noted that Pu is collected in one of the two plutonium
product storage tanks until about 100 1 have accumulated. This means
that one representative sarnple is drawn for 10 plutonium product bottles
together.
Haste
Liquid waste is collected in the central waste tank (7 D-IO; change of
the system compared to former arrangement). Measurement is based on
volume determination (level indicator) and analysis of a sarnple which
is-dra~m-f-rom the -centralwastetank.
The Pu and U content in the hulls isdetermined by
- weighing of the baskets (gross and tare)
_ takiug of sampies of end and middle pieces
- analysis of samples for U and Pu content
Not all baskets are checked.
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1.3. Safeguards Effort (100 %)
1.3.1 General remarks
(i) 100 % inspection effort means that the inspectors spend the
same effort as the operator, not more, e.g. if the operator
does not measure all hull batches then the inspector must not
measure all hull batches either.
(ii) Inspection effort is divided into two parts: inspection effort
spent in the plant (inspection man-hours) and costs for analyses
(US~) which are perforrned in laboratories separated from the
plant in question.
(Ei) A total.of.halfuan inspector man-day is needed forthe introduction
of new inspection personnel per year.
(iv) In the fo l l.owi.ng all inspection efforts
hours. Lt is assumed that one inspector
5 net inspection hours.
1.3.2 Effort before accountability tank
are given in net inspection
man-day corresponds to
Spent fuel elements arrive by truck (8 elements per truck) and are moved
to the spent fuel storage. Safeguards effort per truck: 4 hours.
Fuel elements are identified in the pond; transport from pond to PMC is
witnessed. Actual chopping and transfer of chopped pieces to the
dissolver is wi tnessed (6 baskets correspond to one dissolver batch ).
All these procedures need one hour per input batch (with interruption).
1.3.3 Input accountability
Sparging needs 0.5-1 hour. However, no inspector must be present as
there exist indirect methods to assure that sparging has taken place:
paper records of level instrumentation.
By-passing would require a pipe which could be detected by inspection.
V.olumemeasurement (dip.... tube.... sy.stem)needsfJ.]hour.s. .Recal ibration of
volume measurement instrumentation is performed at the beginning of each
inventory period. Three days for a group of 4 people are needed.
1-2 inspectors would besufficient.
Time-table for the sampling procedure looks as foliows:
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15 min to get in
15 min to get sample bottles
15 min to bring the sample bottles into the sample station
15 min for sparging the tank
15 min for cireulation
15 min to get out.
This means in total 1.5 hours.
Cost per analysis (U + Pu): 400 US~.
1.3.4 Plutonium produet
Time table for the sampling proeedure (one set of sarnples for 10 Pu
produet bottles together).
30 min to get in
15 min to get sample bottles
30 min sparging + sampling
30 min to get sample bottles out
30 min to get out.
This means in total 2.25 hours sampling time. In ease of unforeseeable
events (contamination) the factor 2 ü~y be possible.
Weighing of Pu produet bottles is performed in a frequeney of 8 bottles/day,
that means 1 bottle/hour.
Cost of analysis: 200 US~
Note: Random sampling of bottles in the storage is possible but
eomplieated, see Ref. /13/. The interim storage has about
20 bot t Les ,
1.3.5 Low enriehed uranium produet
Sampling(tanks 5 D-15 A and 15 B) needs about one hour.
Weighing (tank 5 V-I) represents a eontinuous proeess. The time needed
to verify the tare weight and the gross weight is 10 mine
Cost per analysis: 80 US~.
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1.3.6 Was te
Volume determination in the central waste tank (7 D-I0) is performed
by reading the level indicator which needs practically no time.
Sampling needs only 0.5 hours per sample as the sampling station
is in the hot cell aisle of the laboratory. The effort for
verification of an analysis is 2 hours per duplicate analysis.
1. 3.7 Hulls
As the amount of material which remains in the hulls does not
occ~r in the material balance which starts with the measurement
of the accomtability tank content, effort is only necessary for
verifying that all hulls are buried. The effort for this
procedure is 1 h/day.
In order to verify that the amount of material remaining in the
hulls corresponds to the value reported by the operator it is
assumed that it is sufficient to perform once per campaign a
hull measurement for one basket, as controlled leading is very
difficult. This means an effort of 4 h per campaign.
The possibility that buried drums with hulls are taken from
the burial can be excluded.
1.3.8 Inventory
According to Ref. [3], Vol. I, page 34 an inventory at the end of
a campaign needs in total 8 days. Activities of the inspector are
to verify volume determination
sampling
analysis of the samples in the laboratory
It is assurned that 20 inspector man-hours are necessary for the
verification of an inventory taking.
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Liquid Waste [% of input]
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Total input (tons) 17.5 0.175
Number of batches!campaign 25
Batch volume (1) 4000
Amount of materia1/batch (kg) 700 7.0
Batch to batch variation (%) 10
Product
Number of batches/campaign 5 76
Weight of one batch (kg) 15
Amount of material/batch (kg) 4000 2.28
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2. Data of the ALKEM Fabrieation Plant
2.1 Description of the plant
2.1.1 Purpose and type of the plant
The plant will produce fuel pins for thermal and fast breeder reactors.
The pins for the thermal reaetors will contain 0.5 - 4% Plutonium, those
for the fast breeder 10 - 16% Plutonium /1/. It eonsists of an automatie
line, which will be set to work at the end of 1973.
At that time, the so ealled hand line, whieh is working in the
moment, will be liquidated. Therefore we only take the automatie
line into eonsideration.
2.1.2 Capaeityof the plant
The capaeity of the Alkem depends on the Pu-eoneentration. These
data are given in the following table:
i I
eapacity kg / d
Pu - eoneentration % fuel Pu number of pins per day




I1 I .I i
The number of produeed pins will be around 100 per day.
The storage area will take up to 500 kg of fuel.
/1/ Drosselmeyer, E., Cupt a, n., Hagen, A., Kurz, P.
"Development of Saferuards Proeedures and Simulation of Fissile
Haterial FLow for an ALl':EH Type Plant Fabricating P'luconi.um Fuel
Elements for Fast Breeder React.o rs ,"
I:FK 1110 ( 1971)
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2.1.3 Layout of the plant
The comp1ete production equipment is insta11ed in one 1arge







are stibdivided by so called caissons. The sketch of a lay
out of the plant is given in Fig. 2.4, which also contains
the main routes fo11owed by nuc1ear material.
2.2 Flow, handling and location of nuclear material
2.2.1 Pu - storage area
At the storage area the fo11owing items are stored:
a) PuOZ powder in z.o kg containers from the arrival
at the faci1ity up to processing
powder in 2.5 kg containers, produced in the
conversion area and waiting forfurther processing.
c) Pu - nitrate in 8 1 polyaethy1ene bottles (that is
corresponding to 2.0 kg Pu), which are protected by
stain1ess-stee1 tubes, imbedded in concrete.
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2.2.2 Conversion
Half of the incoming plutonium will be Pu-nitrate solution;
with a Pu content of 10 - 20 %. The capacity of this area
is comparatively small, that means that it mainly will produce
for the storage and will start ca. 14 days in advance.
The bottles are emptied into the 800 1 homogenization tank
(5 bottles a 81 per day).The solution is converted to Pu-oxide
1n batches of about 40 1 (oxalate precipitation, filtration,
calcination). The powder will be transported in 2.5 kg containers
and stored in the storage area, 3 - 5 % of the fissile material
are waste.
2.2.'3 Powder Preparation
Coming from the storage area, the Pu powder is calcined in
batches of 25 kg at 7000 - 1.0000 C. Then it is screened, homogenized
in portions of 50 kg. The powder is mixed with sinterable U02 powder
and the recycle scrap and homogenized in portions of 120 kg, which
corresponds to an accumulation of about one week.
The pellets are pressed and dried with a density of 4.8 - 5.8 g/cm3
and a Pu content of 2.5 - 16 %.
4 - 8 % of the feed are expected to be waste.
2.2.4 Pellet Production
The sintering of the pellets takes 24 hours and needs I700
0C
, the
densityof the pellets goes to 9.2 - 10.6 g/cm3• Grinding and
measurement of dimensions and surface of the pellets complete this
production step. They are analysed ort a random base and counted.
2 - 4 % are expected to be waste during the sintering step and
2 - 4 % during the grinding step.
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2.2.5 Pin production
The pellets are put together to partial columns of a length
of 400 mm, and a weight of 320 g;these are measured and
üEntified. Then they are introduced into the cladding tubes. After
decontamination the open end is closed by welding in an
atmosphere of helium.
The expected scrap of 2 - 4 % is generated by pins which do not meet
the specifications, concetning mainly geometry,contamination as weIl
as welding quality.
2.2.6 Quality control
The tests are: pressure test, leak test and x - ray test.
Contamination and total geometry are measured. 3 - 5 % are
expected to be scrap. There is no pDssibility to determine
the Pu-content of the fuel pins.
2.2.7 Pin storage
The finally tested and measured fuel pins are stored at the
pin storage area until shipping.
2.2.8 Analysis
At the analysis area the sampIes coming from different areas
are analysed by different methods: Potentiometry, coulometry
x-ray fluorescence, mass spectrometry and weighing. The
.. _Cl~~!11lllJ.:La.tgg_~ClImÜjlil _a.:r."g_fi11g_daf~t_eranalysis intoa 81 .bo.t.t.Le
and transferred to the waste storage.
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2.2.9 Scrap recovery
Dry scrap consists of rejected pellets, partial piles.
It is grinded and recycled at the powder preparation. Wet scrap,
that means concentrated Pu-nitrate solution is converted in the
conversion area to Pu-Oxide.
2.2.10 (.Jaste Storage
The wastes from different areas divide into wet and dry waste. The
dry one is gathered in 200 1 -barrels, containing 2 g Plutonium or
up to 20 g Plutonium per barrel. The liquid wastes come in 8 l-bottles
from analysis area with a maximal content of 24 g Pu per bottle and
from the conversion area with maximal 72 g Plutonium.
2.3 Flow measurements
2.3.1 Input of Pu
The incoming Pu comes in the form of Pu-Oxyde and Pu-Nitrate.
The input-measurements are done at the shippers facility, so
that only counting, identification and seal control have to
be done at the Alkem.These data tell the Inspector, how much
Pu has entered the facility.
2.3.2 Conversion Area
Half of the incoming Pu will be Pu-Nitrate. When a physical
inventory is done,the amount of solution in the-800 1 homo-
genisation tank has to be determined, but there is no direct
method to do that. Therefore input and output of the conversion
area haveto be controlled bY the inspector.
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The 8 l-bottles are ernptied into the tank, the inspector watches
that and the breaking of the seal s , A sealed dose-pump teIls h Lm
the amount of Pu-nitrate-solution which has been taken out of
the tank. Thus he knows the amount of solution, which is in the
tank. With that data and a dra"~ sample he can determine the amount
of Pu in the homogenisation tank.
2.3.3 Measurements in the Production Area
The data, which are gathered here, give the output data of the plant.
The sintered and grinded pellets are counted and their Pu content
is determined on a random base ,
The insp~ctor takes sarnples of the pellets and counts the number
öf prodticed pellets pet day (reads and controls a counting machine).
The weight and number of the partial piles filled into a hull determine
the amount of Pu in a certain fuel pin, which itself is identified
through a number.
2.3.4 Waste measurements
Dry waste will be gathered in a 200 I-barrel. It will be full after
approximately one production day, then it is closed and sealed and
the Pu-content measured. Once a month the was te-barrels are shipped.
The 8 l~bottles with liquid waste are coming from the analysis area
(appr. 24 g Pu/bottle) and from the conversion area (appr. 72 g Pu/
bottle). The inspector draws a sample from every bottle and then seals
the bottles.
2.3.5 Flow measurement data
Batch data, measurement accuracies and effort per single measurement







The principle of inventory taking at the Alkem
The difficultyin inventory taking at the Alkem is, that the
plant will never be empty or have a total shut-down. In
principle one iso to take physical inventory, when the least
amount of Pu is in the fabrication line and most of it in
the storage areas.
Therefore the inventory should be taken at the end of a cam-
paign. But at that time, the conversion area ,.dU have been
started to produce for the next campaign and the
cladding area will be busy Hith recladding damaged fuel pins.
Pu-storage area
Weight and Pu-content of the received Plutonium containers are de-
termined at the shipper's facility. Thus inventory taking is re-
duced to identification, counting and seal contral.
Conversion Area
The conversion area should be empty apart from the 800 1
homogenisation tank.
The volume of the solution in the tank is determined through
the difference at volumes put into and taken out of the tank.
A drawn sampie at the ti~e of inventory taking then determines
the amount of Pu inside the tank.
The rest of the conversion area is empty apart from the 2 1
containers '(..Ti th approximately 2 kg Pu02, which are in the
storage.
They have to be counted, weighed and their Pu-content is
determined through n-coincidence.
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2.4.4 Powder preparation, pellet and pin-production
During an inventory at the end of a campaign the hull and cladding
will still be in operation. The inspector has to ensure that no material
is brought ~n or out o~ that part. (They are put under containment.)
Powder preparation and pellet production have to be empty; scraps from these
areas are gathered in 2 I-containers and Pu-content determined.
~ben cladding is completed (normally some days after the end of an
inventory taking in the other areas) the inventory of Pu in this areas
is determined.
2.4.5 Pin storage
The pins in the storage are counted and identified and their Pu-content
is determined through a rough y-scanning. This will be done on a random
sampling base during the flow-measurements.
2.4.~ Waste storage
The measurements in the waste storage should have be done during the
flow-verification. Therefore it will be sufficient to count and identify
the units in the storage.
2.4.7 Scrap recovery area
Wet and dry scrap are gathered here and their Pu-content is determined.
2.4.8 Analysis area
The sampies in the analysis area are gathered in 2 l-bottles and their
Pu content is measured through n-coincidence.
2.4.9 Datafor inventory takins




Pu-throughput!year (tons] 1.1 - 1.6
Liquid Waste L% of inputJ 0.1 %
Dry Waste C% of input] 0.4 %
Number of campaigns!year 1 - 10
Number of working days!year 200
recipient number of amount of control measuring effort/measurement standard deviation
tream status or items per Pu per point method per measurement
bulk size year item manhour rand(%) syst(%)
- - _.- _.. "'"'" -,weighing
(ß;ross, tara) 0.2 0.2
Pu-Oxide 2kg-container 350 2 kg shipper
Coulometrie
1 min 0.3 0.4
nput weighing 0.2 0.2Pu-Nitrate 81- bottle 350 2 kg (output ) sampling 1 min 1.0 -conc.det. 0.5 1.0-_.- .
fuel-pins f\I 20,000 N70 g - - reading of the - -
sintered i or or orr-line computer
roduct Pu/U
i
partial piles 'V 80,000 "'17,5g production weighing 0.2 0.2
mixed or or line
oxide pellets '"6,400 ,((x 'V 0.22g laboratorium Coulometrie 0.3 0.4
(random base
-_..,
50 20 g waste n-coincidence
dry waste 200l-barrel and I h 50 50ISO 2 g storage l-spectro-
area scopy
aste
60 24 g analysis weighing I h (weighing) 5.0 -
liquid 8l-bottle area
waste 50 72g conversion sampling 2 h (sampling) 10 20
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70 g 3.0 2.0 110 min Data for fuel pins are given
through flow-measurements,
y-scanning shows rough Pu-
content of the pins.
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W
IVolume determination is given
through the difference betweer.
input and output. The error is
mainly the error of output-
determination.
The sealing of barrels and
8 I-bottles is done during
the flow-measurements.
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Optimal Allocation of Safeguards Effort and Parameter Studies
3. j Introduction
In this chapter the theoretically derived formulae of chapter I shall
be applied to the data of the reference plants in chapter 11. The re-
ference interval of time is one year. It will be assumed that two
inventories/a will be taken.
If an operator wants to divert oaterial he has two possibilities of
doing so. He can report the unfalsified content of the batches to the
inspector but has diverted material beforehand and hopes to conceal this
through the uncertainty of the material balance. The theoretical basis
for that question is found in chapter I, part 2, "Verification of the
material balance". There the solution to the follovling problems is
also given:
a) the optimal way in which the operator will distribute the diverted
amount 11 between the two inventory periods and
b) the optimal way in which the inspector will choose the probabilities
u j and Uz of a false alarm for the first and second inventory period,
if he has a fixed overall probabili ty of a false alarm for the whole
year ,
The next diversion strategy of the operator is to remove a certain amount ~
of material from different batches. This amount will not be so great that
the inspector can detect it through a variable sampling scheme which gives
a high probability of detection for quite a small sampling plan. TIlerefore
the amount ~. diverted from certain batches in the i-th class will be in
~
the range of the systematic error or the batch-to-batch variation. In this
paper we choose the ~. in formula 3-15a to be equal to the square root of
~
the variance of the systematic error.
The question now arises as to how to distribute a given budget in an optimal
way. We are going to employ two different statistical methods; we call them
D1-statistics (cf Chapter I 3.1 and 3.2) and D2-statistics (cf Chapter I 3.3).
After the sampling plan has been evaluated and inspector and operator
have done their measurements a significance test has to be performed again.
Fig. 3.0 gives a flow-diagram of the significance tests whi ch have to be
performed during the course of the reference interval of time.
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2.1 Variance cf the Plutonium Measurements
2.1.1 Inventory Takin~
Every 6 months a physical inventory shall be taken. It is performed through
a flush-out with an amount cf 1 kg Plutonium and an accuracy of ~ 1 kg
Plutonium. In the following, the inventory taking is assumed to be a normally
distributed randorn variable witn expectation v~lue 1 and variance 0.333
(i.e. the variance of a randorn variable which is e1ua11v distributed in
the interval [O,2J).
2.1.2 Variance öf Plutönium Measurements förFlöw~Verificätiön
The data we use are found in the tables 2.2 and 2.3.of Chapter I1;
JlData of the NFS Reprocessing Plant". The reference interval of time is
6 months. which corresponds to 5 campaigns. Therefore. we have 125 input
batches, 380 pröduct batclles and 450 waste batches. The formulae used to
compute the variances for the input, product and waste measurements are
weIl known and written down without further discussion.
Input
The input 1S measured in the input accountability tank. The volume is de-
termined through a dip-tube system, the concentration through sampling and
X-ray fluorescence. We use the following formula:
var(Pur t)rnpu
wi t h






= 125 (nuffiPer of input batches in half a year)
= 7. J kg (amount of Plutonium per batch)
=0.D06kg (Re.L, Btandard.Deviation (RSD) for randomerror. (x)
of concentration determination (x))
0 = 0.003 kg (RSD for systematic error (s) of conc. de t , )s,x
0 = 0.0035 kg (RSD for random error of volume det.)r,v
0 = 0.001 kg (RSD for systematic error of volume det.)s,v
Ö = 0.01 kg (RSD for sampling)p
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With these data we get:





The product measurements are done through weighingJsampling and concentration
determination. The data for the relative standard deviations are found in
Table 2.3 in "NFS-Data".
We take the following formula:
(P ) = N2 . g2var Uproduct
2222222o + N·g·o + 2·N.g·o + N·g 0
s,x r,x r,g p
(The factor 2 in the fOrIDula comes from gross-tare weighing.)
The data are found in Table 2.2 and 2.3 of Chapter 11. We calculate
the variance to
var(.:Pup d ) = 6.97 kg
2
( 8 = 0.003)ro uct
~ig,uid Haste
The amount of Plutonium leaving the plant as waste is measured through volume
determination (level indicator) and concentration determination (TTA extraction
cx-counting) •
The formula-to be used is the following one
var(PUWaste)
With the data of Table 2.2 and 2.3 of Chapter 11 we calculate
= 0.78 kg2 (8 = O. 1)
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Overall Variance of Pu-Measurements 1n Flow~Verification
The var1ance of the flow-measurements is the sum of the var1ances für in~ut,





varU·1UF \) = =
=
0.333 + 16.35 + 0.333
\7.02 kg
2
3. Variance of Uranium Measurements in Flow Verification
In this part we just write down the caIcuIated values for the variances.
The used formulae are the same as before, the data are found in Chapter 11,












= var(UI t) + var(Up d t) + var(UTT t)npu ro uc was e
= 232,233 kl
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2.2 Verification of the Haterial Balance
After an inventory period the operator has reported a set of measurement
data. The. inspector closes the material balance with these data and cal-
culates MUF 1 which is defined in chapter II, 2.1. Now he performs a signi-




2 2 2 + 2(1 1 = (11 + (1n (11
0 1 1
sI = (11 • U(I-Cl 1)
l-ß
MI
= cf> (- -u )1 (11 1-0 1
In the case of the NFS the physical inventories are small (I = 1 kg ~ 1 kg
Plutonium) therefore the variance (1i can be neglected, i.e. (1i is mainly
the variance of the throughput measurements ( (1~ = 17.02 kg 2) . With the
help of formula (ii) the inspector evaluates the significance threshold for
his chosen probability Cl of a false alarm. In Fig. 3.1 one finds sI as a
function of Cl (with (1~ = 17.02 kg 2) .
Two possibilities arise:
or
In the case of H the inspector states that the material balance is correct.
o
In the case of H
1
he states: "Haterial has been diverted". (The activities
which will start now cannot be treated in this paper being of a political
nature. A possible first solution would be to remeasure all the available
batches and to establish a new material balance with a smaller HUF.)
It has to be made clear at this point that the inspector has not the possibility
cf deternuriiiig theamount Hofdiverted materiaL He canonlymälte a -Eftäteme-Iit
in the following form:
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Let a l be the probability of a false alarm, chosen by the inspector.
(In a l % of the cases he will make the wrong statement: "diversion".)
Then he knows: If the operator has diverted M kg Plutonium, in I-ß %
of these cases MUF I will be greater than sI' and a diversion will be
stated.
The probability of detection I-ß as a function of the diverted amount MI
in the case of one inventory period is shown in Fig.3.2, the parameter is
the probability a l of a false alarm (formula iii». We now come to the
second inventory period. MUFZ is calculated and asignificance test is
performed using the following formulae (cf ch. I , 2.2)
(i') 2 2 2 Z° I = °1 + °D + °1
0 I I
2 2 + 2 2
°2 = ° °D + °1s Z 2
(H' ) I-a .. ( l-a I) • ( I-a 2)
(Hi') s2 = °Z·U(l-a 2)
(iv') $ (U I
MI a.M 1+H2
)ß = - -).$ (U-a l ° 1 l-a2 °2
In the case of a NFS type plant the inventory is small and the variance of
Plutonium inventory measurements is assumed to be zero. Furthermore the
throughput D is assumed to be the same for every inventory period. Therefore
2 2
01 = 0z and the significance threshold s2 = sI.
Now the probiem of chöosing a l and (12 in an optimal way to get a fixed overall
probability ü for the whole year
the evaluation shows the optimal choice to be a 1 = a 2; the optimal choice of
the operator to dis tribute the amount M to be diverted in the course of the
two inventory periods is MI = M2 (cf ch. I , 2.2.3). The statement of the
inspectorwil-lbe in· the föl-lowing form:
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Let 0. be the overall probability of a false alarm for the two inven-
tory periods. If the operator has diverted M kg Plutonium in an
optimal way (choosing MI =~ to minimize the probability l-ß of a
detection) in I~ß % of these cases MUF I will be greater than sI
or MUF2 will be greater than s2. That means at least one diversion
will be detected with the probability l-ß • The inspector will choose
0. 1 = 0.2 under the constraint(ii').
The probability of detection l-ß as a function of the diverted amount M
of Pluton um in the case of two inventory periods is shown in Fig.3.3 ,
the parameter is the overall probability 0. of a false alarm (formula iv'»
With the help of formula (ii') written in the following form:
(Li,") 0. = 1- h-a.1/2
the inspector can evaluate for a fixed overall probability 0. of a false
alarm the probabilities 0. 1 and 0. 2• Then he finds the significance thresholds
sI and s2 in Fig. 3• 1 and can perform his significance test.
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2.3 Verification of Data
In the case of the NFS it is possible to verify the data with the help
of two different statistical methods. The first is the so-called D1-
statistic (chapter I, 3.2 ) the second is the Dz-statistic (chapter 1,3.3).
~~at is the difference between the two methods? At the ~ITS an inspector
watches the volume determinations and the taking of samples. That means
that the volurne determination and sarnpling are correct, data could only
be falsified by the operator in reporting a wrong Plutoniun concentration
to the inspector, who on a random base will verify the Plutonium concen-
trations of his sampies. Therefore, in the case of D1-statistics a reduction
of total effort will be reduction of cost for analysis (not every sample
taken by the inspector will be analysed).
If one wants to reduce inspection effort in the plant itself, one has to
employ Dz-statistics. That means not every batch in the course of an in-
ventory period will be supervised by the inspector. Since those batches
controled by the inspector are apriori known to the operator they will
not be falsified. But from the knowledge of the batch-to-batch variation
the inspector can estimate the true content cf the uncontroled batches.
Verification of Data with the help of Dt-statistics
The data used can be found in Table 3.1.
Tab.3.2 shows the optimal sample size for a given effort, in the sixth row the
probability of detection for a fixed amount of diverted material is given.
Fig.3.4 shows the probability of detection as a function of the diverted
amount M with effort as parameter.
One can see that there is only a weak influence of the total effort upon
the probability of detection. The reason for that is the relatively small
standard deviation of the measurements. Therefore, it is reasonable for
the· inspectorto ·takeon-ly 20·% oftheeffortöfeI' fuUcoverage.
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Verification of Data with the help of D2-statistics
The data used can be found in Table 3.3.
They are different frow those in Tab.3. I. The effort is now spent in man-
hours and not in costs for analyses of a sample. Furthermore the standard
deviations are needed only for the inspector's measurements (D1-statistics:
sum of variances for inspector's and for operator's measurements).
Tab.3.4 shows the optimal sample size for a given effort, in the seventh
row one can find the probability of detection for a fixed diverted amount
of Plutonium.
In Fig. 3.5 one finds the probability of detection as a function of the
diverted amount ~ with the effort as parameter.
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3. Application on the Alkem Type Plant
3. 1 Variance of the Plutonium Measurements
3.1.1 Inventory Taking
Every 6 months a physical inventory shall be taken. The inventory taking
in input, product and waste storage is done through seal-control, identi-
fication and counting. In the pin storage the fuel pins are measured on a
random base through y-scanning. It is done during the flow-measurements and
shall provide the inspector with additional information. Therefore this
measurement does not belon~ to the flow nor to the inventory measurements.
In SO % of the campaigns the input will be Plutonium Nitrate Solution
which has to be converted to Plutonium Oxide. The conversion has a smaller
throughput than the production area and has to start a fortnight in advance.
For inventory taking purposes the inventory in the plant should be as small
as possible therefore,the inspector should choose thetime for inventory
taking such that in the following campaign no nitrate will be converted.
The inventory taking reduces to the scrap recovery area with dry and liquid
scrap. The data used can be found in Table 2.7.
Dry Scrap
The containers are weighed (gross and tare, the tara weighing has to be done
by the inspector during the flow measurement activities and has not to be
repeated here). Then a sample is taken and the Pu-concentration is determined
through Potentiometry. We use the following forrnula:
var(Pu)
with
2 2 2 ~ 2 2 N2 2 2= •N• g • {1 + L~· g • {1 + • g • {1r,g r,x - s,x
N = numberof containers l.,ith dry scrap








var(Pu) = 0.010 kg-
Ligpid Sera}?
(ö = 0.004)
The bottles with liquid serap are ~eighed (gross and tara, tara weighing
done beforehand), from each bottle a sample is drawn and analysed. We
use the following formula:
where ö means the relative standard deviation for the sampling. Thus we
p
get:
2var(Pu) = 0.003 kg (0 = 0.01)
Overall Varianee of Pu-Measurernents in Invento;r:y Taking
The varianee of the inventory taking measurements is the sum of the varianees
for dry and liquid waste.
var (I) = 20.013 kg
3.1.2 Varianee of Plutonium Measurements for Flow-Verifieation
The data used are found in Table 2.5 of Chapter 11: "Throughput Data of
the Alkem for Plutonium". The reference interval of time is 6 months.
Input Plutonium-Oxide
Every container is weighed (gross, tara) and the Pu-eontent is determined






175 (number of items in half a year)
2 kg(arnount of Pu per item = container)
rel. standard deviation (RSD) for random (r) error
of weighing (g'ros s-Eera-wei.ghi.ng gives a factor 2)
Due to the gross-tara-weighing there is no systematic error.
0 =r,c
0 =s,c
RSD of random error for concentration determination (c)
RSD of systematic (s) error for concentration deter~mination.
With the data for 0 in Table 2.7 and the above formula we get for the
variance
var(Pu) = 2.46 kg2
Input Plutonium-Nitrate
(0 = 0.004)
The items are Pu-Nitrate bottles. For every 10 bottles one sampIe is drawn
and the Plutonium-concentration of the solution is determined. The amount
of solution is determined by gross tara weighing. We take the follm~ing
formula:
var(Pu)
N = 175, g = 2 kg
RSD for sampling
Resulting variance:
var(Pu) = 13.46 (0 = 0.01)
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Product
The amount of Pu leaving the Alkem is determined through counting and
weighing of the partial columns and through measuring the Pu-concentration
of the pellets on a random basis. Every 2 days the inspector takes a
pellet as sample. Let ~ (i) be the Pu-concentration of the i-th sarnple
in the k-th campaign(k = 1,2,3,4,5), let ~ be the numberof partial piles
per campaign,







(He take 5 campaigns a 20 working days each; that means ~ is the same for
every campai.gn; )
We get for the output of Plutonium in product:
5 ~
G(i)
(Puout) = L .L . ~k=1 ~=I k
G~i) = weight of the i-th partial column in the k-th campaign.
He assume that G~i), ~i), ~ are the same for every i and k ,










g = Cox ~s the Pu-content per partial column
o = the~rtanaar-dcdevil'fdOfi {SD} focr systematic {s} andrandom (r)
error of concentration determination (x) and weighing (g) respectively.
The RSDo is determined through
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=-x
Thus we get for the variance:
var(Pu)
o is given through the calibration error of the laboratory where thes,x
1 . . d d· h f . ~2 1 2ana ys~s ~s one an ~s t e same or every campa1gn, whereas u - = --10 0r,x r,x
depends on the sampling plan. 1~e write the formula in the following form:
We take g = 17.5'10-3 kg and n = 10.000 and get
var(Pu t) = 15.45 kg2 (0 = 0.005).ou
P!y Waste
The dry waste comes in 200 I-barrels into the waste storage area and is measured
through n-coincidence and y-spectroscopy. During half a year there will be
25 barrels with 20 g Plutonium and 75 barrels 'with 2 g Plutonium. We use
the following formula:
var(dry waste)
with gl = 0.02 kg and g2 = 0.002 kg. Thus we get
var (dry was te) = 0.0707 kg2 (0 = 0.409).
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Liquid {-laste
Liquid waste comes from the analysis area (30 bottles with 0.024 kg Plutonium
in half a year) and from the conversion area (25 bottles with 0.072 kg Plutonium).
The 8 l-bottles are weighed gross and tara, they aresample.d and their
Plutonium concentration is determined. We use the following formula:
var(Liquid Waste) 2 2 + ö2 + ö2 )= 30·g 1·(ör,g r,p r,c
+ 302• 2(ö 2 + ö2 + ö2 ) 2+ 25·g2gl s,g s,p s,c
var(Liquid {vaste) (30.g~
2 . 2 2 2= + 25·g2)·(2. + + r c)r,g r,p ,
(302.g2 252.g~).( 2 2+ + + s c)1 s,p ,
with gl = 0.024 kg and g2 = 0.072 kg, ör,p
deviation for sampling, random and systematic.
relative standard
var(Liquid Haste) = 0.1905 kg 2 ö = 0.173.
Overall Variance of Pu-Measurements in Flow Verification
The variance of the flow-measurements iso the sum of the variances for
input, product and waste measurements.
Thus var(D) 2= 31.63 kg •
-91-
3.2 Verification of the Haterial Balance
In this part the same formulae hold as in (2.2). The inspector closes
the material balance after the first inventory period and calculates MUF J•
Then he performs the significance test calculating the significance threshold
sI with the help of formula (ii) for his chosen probability a of a false
alarm.
In Fig.3.6 one finds SI as a function of a with 01 = 5.6 kg. Fig.3.7 shows
the probability of detection l-ß as a function of the diverted amount M of
Plutonium in the case of one inventory periods l.rith c , the probability of a
false alarm as parameter.
We now come to the second inventory period. MUF2 is calculated and a significance
test Ls perförtnedüsirig theformtllae Ci' F·(iV') in (2.2). In the case of the
Alkem type plant the inventory and the total variance of the inventory measure-
ments are small (var I 0 0.013 kg2). Therefore the starting inventory for
the second inventory period is approximately the same as the physical inven-
tory (formula 2.8 of ch. I with a 0 0.0004). Again we assume that the through-
put D is the same for the two inventory periods and get 01 = 02' sJ = s2.
Then the optimal way to choose .the probabilities of a false alarm i8 a J = a 2;
the optimal choice of the operator to distribute the amount M to be diverted
in the course of the two inventory periods is MI = M2• The probability of
detection l-ß as a function of the diverted amount M in the case of two
inventory periods is shown in Fig.3.8, the parameter is the overall probability
of a false alarm (formula iv'). With the help of formula (ii f ' ) the inspector
evaluates for a fixed overall probability a of a false alarm the probabilities
a l and aZe Then he finds the significance thresholds SI and s2 in Fig.
3• 6 and
can perform his significance test.
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3.3 Verification of Data
In the case of the Alkem type plant the data will be verified with the help
of DI~statistics (chapter I, 3.1 and 3.2). Not all the data, reported during
an inventory period can be verified through means of D-statistics. Most of
the measurements have to be supervised or done by the inspector. There re-
main three sets of classes of material upon which D-statistics can be
employed.
There remains the class of the fuel pins, produced during the inventory period.
Though the inspector knows the content of Plutonium through the flow-measure-
ments, he wants to have a direct methodto verify the Pu-content of that
class. Itcan be done through y-scanning but only on a random base because of
the huge number of in half a year produced pins. Additionally, the inspector
only wants to make sure that the Pu-content of the pins lies inside certain
boundaries. We remark here that these measurements are not the output measure-
ments and do not burden the material balance with their uncertainty. The
theoretical basis for the following discussions is the part 3.1 of chapter I.
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We find the standard deviation of the sum of the measurements to be
approximately 0.064 kg2• Therefore for a diversion of more than
-40.252 kg the operator will choose r = N and ~ = M·IO • In Fig. 3.10
we find the probability of detection as a function of the diverted
amount of Plutonium, calculated for the case r = 10,000 and different
n between 10,000 and 500.
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Table 3. I: Data of NFS for D1-statistics
Stream N(half a year) €:(US~) er2(kg2) 2 (kg 2)err s
Input 125 400 1.5 . 10-2 9.8 · 10-4
Product 380 200 , 4.3 . 10-4 9.5 · ,10-5,
I
; i
: Haste 450 40 j 2.0 •
10-4 9.0 · 10-6
" I
Table 3.2: Optimal sample size for a given effort in case of D1-statistics
% 100 80 60 50 30 20 10 5




+) I0 I 125 101 61 . 41 20 10n l 125 125
:
0 380 280 163 136 81 i 54 27 14n 2
0 450 228 135 65 65 43 25 10n3
I
p % (M= 14kg) ! 76.7 76.5 I 76,0 72.9 72.9 70.1 63,0 151.9
+)n~ > NI' therefore full coverage in that class, C-€:INI distributed in
an optimal way on the classes 2 and 3.
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Table 3.3: Date of NFS for D2-statistics
- -
Stream N(half a year) g/h/ 2 /kl/ C1
2/ kg2/ 2 / kg2/C1 C1r s v
Input 125 2.2 -3 5.7.10-4 0.57762.8·10
Product 380 5.25 8.5. 1O~3 0.5. 1O~4 5.29.10-2
,.;raste 450 2.6 9oIO-6 4.5.10-6 9.03.10-3
Table 3.4: Optimal sample size for a given ~ffort employing D2-statistics
L
% 100 80 60 50 30 20
Effort C 3,440 2,752 2,064 1,720 1,032 688
0 125 125+) 125+) 125+) I 125+) 108n l
0 380 351 254 205 107 59n2
0 450 244 176 142 74 41n3
C1 5.854 6.274 7. 113 7.764 10.310 13.992
ßM=20 kg I 96.3 93.8 87.9 82.6 61.8 41.7 I
+) on l >NI' therefore full coverage in that class, C-E 1N1 diRtributed
in an optimal way on the classes 2 and 3.
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Table 3.5: Data of Alkem for D1-statistics
---.... - ---
Class (12 2 (12&iJ EihjN /Js.g"Jr s
Dry SO -5 8°10-6scrap 2.45' 10 2.5
Liquid scrap 20 4.51'10-5 1.25'10-5 3.0
Fuel-pins 10,000 8.8' 10- 6 -6 o. 173.9·10
Dry was te 1 25 2. 10-4 2.10-4 1
Dry waste 2 75 2' 10-6 2' 10-6 1
- -5 1.04' 10-4Liquid waste 1 30 4.6' 10 3
Li.qui.dwas te 2 25 -4 9.33'10-4 34.15'10
Table 3.6: Optimal sample size for a given effort for the classes
liquidand dry scrap
----
% 100 80 60 50 30 20
Effort C 185 148 111 92.5 55.5 37
0 50 41 31 26 16 10n 1
I
0









































by the Safeguards Authority











Fig. 3. 1 Significance threshold 5 os a function of the
probability ().. of a false alarm. (62: 17.02 kg 2)
10












Fig.3.2 Probability of detection i-ß as a function of the diver-
ted amount M of Plutonium in case of one inventory
period of half a year for the NFS; parameter:
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Fig. 3. 3 Probebit ity of detection 1- ß es a function of the diverted amount M
of Plutoni um in case of two inventory periods for t he NFS j
purcrneter probability rJ.. of a false olorrn.
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Fig3.4 Probability of detection 1- ß and per batch diverted amount )J iO
(i=1.. 2,,3 .. ~=N/2) as a function of the total diverted amount M in ccse of
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Fig.3.5 Probcbility of detection 1 - ß es a tunction of the diverted amount M






















Fig.3.7 Probability of detection 1- f3 es 0 function of the
diverted amount M of Plutonium in case of one
inventory period of half a yecr for the Alkem j


















Fig.3.8 Probabil ty of detection 1- ß as a function of the diverted amount M of
Plutonium in case of two inventory per iods of half a year for the Alkem ,
pcrcmeter probability of false alarm.
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Fig.3.9 Probcbi ity of dletection 1- ß andl per batch dlivettedl amount lJ iO (i =1,,2 R =N12 )
for the Iclasses dry end liquid scrap es Q function of the totcl diverted

























Fig.3.10 Probability of detection and per batch diverted cmounr .p es 0 function
of t He total diverted amount M for n: 10,000 1000
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Conclusions
The main purpose of the investigations carried out in this report has been
to show the possibilities of use of game theoretical methods in optimizing
safeguards efforts of an international safeguards organization. Since the
optimization process is influenced by fairly complex interrelations of a
large number of factors,boundary conditions and assumptions, the conclusions
which can be derived from the process and results of such an optimization,
can seldom be formulated in highly generalized terms. They are always subject
to the restraints used in developing the methods and the validity of the
assumptions. Bearing this in mind, it appears worthwhile to draw attention
to a number of conclusions. However, before that it is useful to make one
pointclear in connection with the decision theoretical methods ..
Optimization methods based on decision theory are developed on the conflict
situation arising out of the system under consideration. For an international
safeguards organization the conflict situation comes out of the fundamental
ass~~tion that the probability of a diversion of fissionable material at
the national level out of its peaceful nuclear sector, although small, is not
zero. This basic assumption ultimately justifies the necessity of an inter-
national safeguards organization. The safeguards organization has therefore
to use the methods which are aimed at countering threats of such diversions.
Under such a condition, it becomes necessary to define clearly the diversion
modes or threats for nuclear materials before the game theoretical methods
can be used to develop the countermethods of the safeguards org~nization.
In this report three possible modes of diversion have been considered.
a) Diversion of material from the inputs, outputs and inventories
of a plant. The data submitted by facility operators to the safe-
guards organizations are assumed not to be falsified.
b) Diversion of material on the basis of some falsi.fied data submitted
tothe safeguardsorganizatdon. The safeguards organizationhas in
principle the possibility of verifying all the submitted data
(Dl-statistics).
-107-
c) Diversion of material on the basis of submitted data to the
safeguards organization which the organization cannot verify
afterwards. The organization has however some a-priori knowledge
of the possible batch to batch variation of the content of
fissionable material in the batches. The facility operator can
plan a diversion only within this variation (D2-statistics).
The first of the above modes of diversions is possible because of the measure-
rnent uncertainties in establishing a material balance. The second two modes
of diversion are possible only if the inspectors measure apart of the
batches on a random sampling basis. Theoretically, these two types of diver-
sions would not be possible if the inspectors verified the data for all the
batches submitted by the facility operators. However, in reality, inspectors
would seldom be in a position (because of economical or technical restrictions)
to verify all the data. It is to be noted that the above mentioned diversion
modes can be construed only in the framework of the safeguards system laid
down in INFCIRC/153. For exareple, if the safeguards organization prepared
its tedlnical conclusions on the basis of the material balance established
by its own measurements without taking into account the data submitted by
facility operators, the mode of diversion to be considered would have been
different.
The conclusions which appear relevant are now summarized.
1. In developing the decision theoretical model for the optimum strategies
for inspectors and the facility operators in connection with the state-
ment of a material balance in a facility over a given period of time,
it has been assumed that two physical inventories will be taken in a
year. The inspectors distribute the false alarm probabilities 01 an« 02
amongst the two material balance periods in such a way that an overall
false alarm probability ° = 1-(1-01)(1-02) is guaranteed. Furthermore
he would like to deterrnine the guaranteed probability of detection after
~~1<.!ll~~Il;()_~olls!clera~ionCl.llJ)~s.s!ble strategi:s with_ respect to the
total diversion of fissionable material M = M1+M2, which the facility
operator may plan to make. The facility operators would on the other
hand, like to dis tribute the MI and ~ aIT~unt among the alO material
balance periods in such a way that this probability of detection is
minimized.
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An analysis of the existence of saddle points for the ahove mentioned
lünimax strategies shows that under the set of conditions specified
in chapter I, the optimal strategies of the inspectors are independent
of the total amount 1-1 assumed to be diverted by the operator.
2. For practical purposes the optimal strategy of the inspectors is sufficient-
1y good approximated by choosing a l = a 2 = 1- II-a.
3. Although the exact distribution of the }WF in a material balance is combined
from two types of statistical distributions namely, normal distribution
coming from the measurement uncertainties and hypergeometric distribution
coreing from the ass~ed mode of diversion, for all practical purposes the
total tlliF can be assumed to be normal1y distributed. This simplifies the
associated algorithm and reduces the required calculation time in a very
significant manner.
4. The game theoretical models for the D} and D2-statistics (for the diversion
modes described under b ) and c) above) are solved ,·dth the use of Lagrange
multipliers under a number of simplifying assumptions (e.g. 1 « n.;
1.
" 2 J 2, ... 'h • Li fv i .r , « l~.; (J I n . «(i J. Keep i ng a.n V1.ew rnese s i.mp ...1. ya.ng assump t rons
1. 1. r. 1. S.
it appears tfiat the optimum strategies for both the inspectors and the
operators are influenced mainly by the va1ues cf ~i ' i.e. the amounts
assumed to be diverted from each of the batches. This fact might appear
to be somewhat uncomfortable at the first glance since the inspection
organization may not have information on the possible and actual arnounts
of ~i. However, under praceica1 operating conditions in a facility,
material balance data cannot be rnanipu1ated in an unlimited manner. The
technical conditions and tolerance specification for the various strearns
and inventories in a facility force the facility
the recorded and reported data within well-defined limits. Two of such
important limits are the bateh to bateh variation and the systematic




5. The results of the parameter variation discussed in chapter 111
also bring out SOIT~ interesting points which permit further con-
clusions to be drawn. These exarnples illustrate the point that
mathematical models howeve r elegant and sophisticated, must be
checked with the realistic values to have a feeling for the ranges
of their validity and their limitations.
6. In the examples on D1-statistics with the data on the NFS and the Alkem
type plant, it seems that for a given value of a, a variation in the
inspection manhours and a variation of the numbers of sampies analysed
for verification, in the range of 20 % - 100 % of the full coverage,
no significant change is observed with regard to the probability of
detection and the amount M assumed to be diverted. In other words,
safeguards efforts can be kept at a fairly low level without deteriorating
the quality of a statement on the }ruF and the limits of its accuracy.
Also an increase in safeguards efforts beyond about 30 % of the full
coverage would not bring in significant irnprovement in that statement.
The main reason lies in the fact that in the examples analysed, the
absolute value of M for a given a and ß value is determined mainly by
the assumed systematic errors of measurement. The influence of the random
errors of measurement decreases rapidly with increasing number of the
sampies verified. These results point to the fact that the actual level
of inspection effort will be determined after taking into account other
factors than the measurement errors alone. They may be for exarnple,
the efforts required to ensure the credibility of the information obtained.
7. The results based on D2-statistics (input data for the NFS plant) show
on the other hand, that for a given a and ß value, the amount for which
a diversion can be construed increases rapidly with decreasing inspection
efforts. The main reason for this is the high value of batch-to-batch
variation assumed in this example (~ 10 % of the mean value). The batch-
to-batch variation can be expected to decrease with an increasing use of
isotop'ic correlations and increasing standardizationoffuel elements,
dissolving procedures etc.
The D2-statistics provide a mean to the inspectors for having an idea
on a diversion in those cases in which the facility operators carry out
measurements in a seouential manner and the reported data cannot be verified
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(for example when the batches after measurement change identity or
enter a process area in whicll they can no longer be measured). This
method is still in its initial stages of development.
8. Probable areas for further work
A careful analysis of the work carried out under the present contract
indicates that further work would be useful in the following areas.
a) In developing the methods and working out examples, the frequency
of inventory/a has been fixed as a boundary condition. Two inventories/a
were used mainly after taking into consideration the operation practices
in a facility. lIowever the area of frequency of inventories and detection
time appears to be worthwhile exploring. For exarnple the number of
inventories/a may not be fixed but to be chosen - subjected by con-
straints as costs per inventory - in such a way that the overall
probability of detection is maximized. Another extension would be
that within a given sequence of inventories/a the safeguards organization
would like to detect a diversion of a given amount as early as possible
under a given set of conditions whereas, the facility operator would
like to dis tribute the same amount amongst the inventory periods in
such a manner that the detection is delayed as much as possible.
vfuat would be the optimum strategies of both? The game theoretical
model developed in this report may be expanded to incorporate such
variations.
b) As mentioned earlier, the solutions of the minimax problem for the
two strategies based on D1- and Dz-statistics have been obtained by
the use of Lagrance multipliers. The limitations of such a solution
are weIl known. Among others, the n. and r. have to be assumed to be
1. 1.
continuous variables (which is not so serious for large n. and r. )
1. 1.
and the restrictions n. < N.; r. < N. cannot be built in into the
1. - 1. 1. - 1.
method which often leads to solutions with n . > N. or r , > N.•
1. 1. 1. 1.
Besides,it is not always evident whether the solution gives an absolute
or a relative minimum/maximum. It is therefore necessary to analyse
this methodmore deeply and investigate the possibility of using other
methods for the solution of similar problems.
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c) The possibility of extending the use of the models considered to a
fuel cycle consisting of a number of different types of facilities
can be investigated in detail. This may include among others
analysis of the possibility of a rationalization of the frequency
and sequence of inventories/a in the whole fuel cycle as weIL as
rationalization of the distribution of safeguards efforts in all
the facilities in the cycle.
The safeguards project at Karlsruhe is expected to continue to work
in the above mentioned fields in the coming years.
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